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This thesis examines naval base expansion by the U.S. Navy during peace-time from 
1898 to 1916 as the basis for considering important aspects of American naval policy and 
politics during a critical period of growth.  It delineates the base budgetary dynamics of 
the navy, therefore providing a more complete representation of the dynamics of 
supporting a fleet.  There are two related major arguments.  First, that the United States 
built a fleet without adequate provision for the bases to support operations.  And second, 
the naval spending was, largely driven by legislative political rather than strategic 
considerations.  Exposition of these propositions will include consideration of the 
problem of naval bases as affected by ‘pork-barrel politics, the manifestations of inter-
service rivalry, and the lack of enforcement of a general naval policy.  In addition, this 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
At the turn of the twentieth century the battleship was the predominant warship 
type and as such the primary constituent of naval power.  These vessels caught the 
attention of the public and were the measure of the relative strengths of navies.  In 1905, 
the launch of the Dreadnought, which was faster and more powerful than all earlier 
battleships, marked a new phase of the naval arms race across the globe.  Navies were 
spurred to replace their old units with modern capital ships.  In the United States, the 
fascination with battleships resulted in their being built in disproportionately large 
numbers at the expense of smaller warships and the support facilities.  After the Spanish-
American War the United States authorized a minimum of one battleship per year.  Yet, 
after 1904, the United States did not authorize any cruisers until 1916 and only ordered 
sixty-four destroyers. The resulting ratio of battleships to lesser warships was one to 
three.
1
  In comparison, British Royal Navy, the largest fleet in the world, had a ratio 
during the same period of one to eight.
2
  While the Royal Navy built a balanced fleet and 
naval base structure to support operations around the globe, the United States Navy and 
Congress focused on battleships, and by doing so sacrificed operational capability for the 
appearance of strength. 
Starting with the New Navy Act in 1883, the U.S. Navy began building a fleet 
consisting of up-to-date warships.  The first ships of the New Navy fought in the Spanish-
American War and the size of the fleet dramatically increased after the war.  Along with 
the increase in the size and numbers of ships and greater numbers of seamen the Navy 
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expanded and modernized its shore establishments.   Naval bases provided mooring and 
dry dock facilities, along with repair shops and supply warehouses to keep the new fleet 
active and adequately repaired.   However, while the construction of new battleships 
continued in varying annual numbers throughout the early twentieth century, a 
corresponding increase in naval facilities was not funded.  Although the proportion of 
naval funding spent on new battleships and personnel increased there was no 
corresponding increase in public works, maintenance of yards, or maintenance of ships.  
Without an increase in number and size of facilities ashore the new ships the United 
States built would soon have been incapable of sailing.  Steam-powered warships 
demanded more frequent maintenance and their steel hulls required regular dry docking 
periods to scrape the hulls.  As the ships grew in size and displacement, longer piers and 
deeper harbors were necessary to moor the ships safe in harbors.  Bigger dry docks were 
also mandatory to support the increased size.   
While navy yards located around the industrial and population centers of Boston, 
New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk allowed for ease of production and ship 
construction, they were far from any likely naval operational areas.  Bases were needed to 
repair battle damaged ships and get the ships back to the fleet as rapidly as possible.  The 
closer a major naval base, with heavy lift cranes and large dry docks, was to an area of 
operations, the quicker a naval vessel could return to the fleet.  For the United States, 
after the Spanish-American War, the main area of possible operations was the Far East.  
The Caribbean remained a significant region though to a lesser extent than the Far East.   
Serious historical writing about the American naval renaissance in the late 




Sprout published The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918.
3
  George Davis 
followed in the next year with A Navy Second to None.
4
  Both works offered early 
narratives of the growth of the American Navy and the emergence of the Navy as a world 
power, while focusing primarily on the development of the battle fleet and neglecting 
domestic base expansion.  Overseas bases and facilities were only mentioned as an 
example of the diplomatic role of the Navy.  More recent surveys addressed bases to a 
greater degree and examined the links between bases, national politics, and diplomatic 
moves.  George Baer’s One Hundred Years of Sea Power and Robert Love’s History of 
the U.S. Navy incorporated these examinations; however, naval bases did not receive the 
attention that they deserved.
5
   
There are several works that focused specifically on the rise of the New Navy in 
the late nineteenth century.  Like several of the monographs mentioned previously, the 
focus remained heavily on the creation of the battleship fleet and paid little attention to 
naval bases.  Walter Herrick’s The American Naval Revolution served as the main 
example of the battleship centric historiography.
6
  Benjamin Cooling’s Gray Steel and 
Blue Water Navy looked closely at the rise of the military-industrial complex during the 
period, covering armor production and armament development but ignored naval bases.
7
  
A recent addition to the works on the growth of the military-industrial complex was 
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  Epstein examined both the U.S. and British development 
of the self-propelled torpedo.  Both works examined the evolution of both military 
contracts and naval factories.  The overall growth of naval bases during the same period 
was not addressed in either monograph. 
Other works focused on Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency and his influence on 
the Navy.  Two of these works were Gordon O’Gara’s Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise 
of the Modern Navy and Henry J. Hendrix’s Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy.
9
  
Both works examined Roosevelt’s role in increasing the size and importance of the navy.  
However, both largely ignore naval bases except a few overseas installations.   Though 
the writers put base growth in context with other naval spending and policies during 
Roosevelt’s presidency, there were no comparisons to the following presidents.  While 
Roosevelt groomed Taft as his successor, Taft did not support the overseas base 
expansion and domestic improvements begun under Roosevelt.  Under Wilson, bases 
gained increasing support as American involvement in the Great War became likely. 
During the period covered by this thesis Pacific bases received the most 
attention.
10
  Additionally, the significance of these bases was frequently overplayed with 
respect to their contribution to the Navy during the pre-World War One period.  The only 
complete survey of naval bases is Paolo E. Coletta’s edited volumes of both domestic and 
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foreign Navy and Marine Corps bases.
11
  These two volumes are compilations of 
individual base histories with little to no context of how each base interacted with others 
for funding or supporting the fleet. 
Analyzing the period from the Spanish-American War to the Naval Act of 1916 
allows the individual policies of presidents and secretaries of the navy to be viewed in 
relationship to one another.  Expansion overseas contrasted with the growth of naval 
installations domestically provides better context for both.  Imbalances in budgets and 
location of bases become strikingly evident when viewed over the nineteen-year span.  
The yearly funding changes are better compared over a multi-year span where differences 
are easily spotted and tied in with changes to naval policies and political support. 
Coming to an understanding of the interaction between politics and military 
requests can be achieved through the examination of base growth and funding 
proportions.   Funding and support for bases were always affected by political 
considerations.  Numerous factions inside Congress, from heartland senators to coastal 
congressmen, all weighed in and competed for limited funding.  These deliberations 
concerned the proper support needed for the Navy along with the distribution of naval 
bases as well the cost of moving or closing and opening new bases to move naval 
spending into new political regions.  Changes in congressional leaders, executive 
personnel, and admirals along with a shift in political environment fostered uncertainty 
for long-term funding.  Politicians preferred to spend money in their home state, and at 
the very most inside the continental United States.  Overseas bases lacked political 
support and the concept of large navy yards abroad threatened congressmen from coastal 
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states with the diversion of resources abroad; that is overseas bases would take work and 
federal money away from their domestic programs.
12
  Pearl Harbor was the only overseas 
base that had begun to be built to the level of a navy yard by 1916. 
The Navy enjoyed moderately steady support during Theodore Roosevelt’s 
presidency.  Support decreased under William Taft’s administration as politics shifted the 
focus of naval funding to battleship growth.  Naval base standing received new attention 
but no increase in funding during Woodrow Wilson’s first term.  Based off of both yearly 
appropriations as well as reported expenditures compiled for the Naval Yearbook starting 
in 1910, yearly naval spending is easily tracked.
13
  Total naval expenditures remained a 
steady fifteen to twenty percent of total federal spending.  The Army made up another 
twenty to twenty-five percent of federal expenditures.  While the Spanish-American War 
expenses caused a spike in the relative total expenditures, several patterns emerged from 
the funding breakdowns.  Naval base funding came under several sections of yearly naval 
budgets.  Base improvements were under Public Works, while maintenance of the bases 
and ships were additional separate line items.   The trend of naval budget percentage 
spent on base public works dropped from a peak of nine percent in 1901 and declined to 
three percent in 1908 and remained fairly steady until 1910, rose briefly in 1911, and then 
sharply declined to one percent in 1916.  As for the maintenance of both the bases and 
ships, the funding remained a fairly constant percentage of naval spending, close to one 
percent and seven percent respectively.  During the same time period the percentage of 
naval expenditures on ship construction and pay increased dramatically.  Pay increased 
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on a consistent line from thirteen percent in 1898 to twenty-six percent in 1916.  Ship 
construction grew as well except that it peaked at forty percent in 1904, decreased to 
fifteen percent in 1913 and rose again in the next three years to thirty percent with the 
major building program approved in 1916.  As the American fleet increased in numbers 
and ship size, the facilities did not keep pace with the increases and overseas support 
lagged the furthest behind of all naval bases.  In the end the United States built a large 
battle fleet but not an operationally deployable navy.  They lacked the ability to use the 
fleet in possible operational areas due to the distances to naval bases and the deficiency 
of these bases, especially overseas.  
Examination of base expansion will begin with the nature of naval stations and 
the existing system on the eve of the Spanish-American War.  The creation of bases after 
the Spanish- American War follows with the arguments used during the period for what 
constituted the proper balance of bases.  Political debates over bases will be addressed 
first with overseas bases in the Caribbean than in the Pacific Ocean and along the West 
Coast and finally on the East Coast.  These deliberations over bases will serve as a case 
study of the role politics in naval expansion.  Along with the creation of new naval bases, 
dry dock expansion and growth is the last key to understanding the requirements and 
pressure put on naval bases to grow to accommodate the increasingly large battleships of 




Chapter 2: Nature of Naval Bases 
Naval bases have been essential to navies since Athens and Carthage in ancient 
times.  Over the centuries their characteristics and facilities changed and improved while 
their basic function remained the same, support of the fleet.  At the start of the Spanish-
American War there were a total of eleven naval installations.  The distribution of naval 
installations was heavily weighted to the Northeastern corner of the United States.  Two 
navy yards, Boston and Portsmouth, were only 70 miles apart.  Following down the 
Atlantic Coast was Newport, New York, League Island in Philadelphia, Norfolk, Port 
Royal, and at the end of the Atlantic coastline was Naval Station Key West.  Along the 
Gulf Coast there was an additional naval installation at Pensacola. On the West Coast 
there were only two naval bases, the Mare Island Navy Yard just south of San Francisco 
Bay and Puget Sound Naval Station across the sound from Seattle. 
The Navy operated three types of shore facilities in support of their fleet; navy 
yards, naval stations, and coaling stations.  Navy yards were primarily established to 
build naval ships, yet with the same facilities were well-equipped to carry out repairs.
14
  
Dry docks, large maintenance shops, and fabrication shops existed to outfit ships.  Naval 
stations provided mooring and supply facilities, with their main purpose of being 
homeports for ships to sail from.  Naval stations had some repair facilities, but these were 
limited in comparison to the navy yards.  At the lowest level of naval installation were 
coaling stations.  Coaling stations provided ships with stocks of coal and were either 
adjacent to existing navy yards and naval stations or were independent from existing 
naval infrastructure.  Independent coaling stations primarily consisted of coal sheds and a 
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delivery method for the coal to ships.  Equipment ranged from large coal gantries to small 
railways from sheds to the piers.
15
 
 Facilities differed from base to base, even within categories.  Variances included 
differences in the number of piers and dry docks to the sizes of ships capable of being 
sustained.  On top of variation within base types, the difference between the types were 
often only in size and not in actual facilities as several naval stations contained a dry dock 
while the Washington Navy Yard had no dry dock.  Facilities differed from base to base 
since the actual classification of a naval installation was done by executive orders, not by 
minimum facility levels.  This meant that the number of piers and dry docks would vary 
between bases, as would the size of ships capable of being sustained at an installation.   
Several of the navy yards, including New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, had 
existed before the War of 1812.  Mare Island was established in 1853, becoming the first 
permanent naval base on the west coast.
16
 Naval stations were a later development called 
into being by new operational requirements, including training of squadrons.
17
 Permanent 
coaling stations were the most recent of the installations; though numerous stations had 
existed during the Civil War to support the blockading ships.  The new stations were 
created as one of the lessons learned from the Spanish-American War.
18
   
Steam propulsion created new requirements for support ashore.  Steam machine 
shops, increased docking requirements, and fuel supplies were all essential to support the 
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new steam technology.  Shore establishments had to change to support the technology 
with technical specialists, shops to repair the engines, along with increased docking 
capability to accommodate increases in ship size.  On top of all these changes, the biggest 
shift was the creation of stockpiles of fuel; coal initially and later oil.  Without these 
stockpiles around the globe, ships could not operate outside their nation’s coast.  
Technological developments were not limited to steam propulsion; armor, armaments, 
and hull materials all changed during the nineteenth century.  As the rate of technological 
change increased, bases had to improve at a comparable rate.  In practice however, the 
two rates between ship improvements and base improvements rarely matched. 
The largest navy yard during this period was New York Navy Yard. In 1898, it 
had two operational dry docks and an additional dock under construction.  Congress 
appropriated $153,000 in Public Works improvement to the yard.  Improvements 
included continued dry dock construction, dredging, building of new steel storehouses, 
and electrifying the yard.
19
  During that year the total operating cost for the yard was 
$1,699,700; of this $1,517,000 was spent on civilian yard labor, materials, and supplies 
for the repair and outfitting of vessels for the Spanish-American War.  Other yards’ 
budgets were small in comparison to New York.  The next two largest operating budgets 
were Norfolk Navy Yard with $841,700 and Mare Island Navy Yard with $731,300.
20
  
The public works expenditures for the two yards were $130,000 and $216,800 
respectively. 
21
  In subsequent years, while other navy yards would receive more funding 
than New York, the yard remained a key installation to the Navy due to her overall size 
and the facilities offered at New York. 
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There were only four naval stations in existence prior to the Spanish-American 
War: Newport, RI, Port Royal, SC, Pensacola, FL, and Puget Sound, WA.  Puget Sound 
and Port Royal were opened or reopened respectively in the early 1890s to support the 
increased training required of the fleet.  Both of the stations had drydocks while the other 
two stations did not have these facilities.  Of the stations, the largest was Puget Sound.  
During the Spanish American War, Puget Sound spent $75,000 in operations and repairs 
with $53,000 of the total spent specifically on ship maintenance and outfitting.
22
  During 
that year Puget Sound received improvements to the station totaling $80,000.
23
  At the 
outbreak of war there were no coaling stations.  
Integral to naval bases were drydocks.  Modern steel hulled ships required regular 
maintenance on their underwater hull.  Drydocks allowed for this maintenance to be 
carried out.  At the turn of the twentieth century there were two types, floating drydocks 
and graving docks.  Floating drydocks were pontoon structures that would be sunk under 
a ship and then pumped dry and rose out of the water with the ship on a platform between 
the pontoons.  Graving docks were excavated structures built into coastal banks where a 
ship would be floated in, a caisson closed behind, and the water pumped out, leaving the 
ship resting on blocks out of the water.  Older methods were growing increasingly 
impractical for the larger ships.  Careening, beaching a ship on her side, was nearly 
impossible and ship railways and lifts were impractical to be constructed at the required 
size for the new battleships and cruisers.  Without drydocks the maintenance of the fleet 
was impossible. 
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Floating drydocks were constructed out of steel and took around three years to 
complete.  Upon completion they would be towed to any base around the world.  An 
advantage of the floating drydocks was their mobility; they could be relocated, which 
allowed for flexibility in ship maintenance.  Yet, the size of vessels capable of being 
lifted by these docks was fairly limited.  Only a few floating drydocks could lift armored 
cruisers and battleships.  The two floating drydocks in use by the Navy by 1916 were 
Dewey at Olongapo and one at New Orleans Naval Station.
24
  They cost a total of 
$1,980,000 to complete and both entered service by 1905.  Their maximum capacities 
were the Connecticut class battleships of 1906.
25
 
Graving docks were more numerous and capable compared to the floating 
drydocks.  Graving docks could be made out of various materials, including wood, 
granite, and concrete.  Wood docks were quicker and cheaper to build, however, they 
required frequent maintenance and repair to keep them in service.  Granite and concrete 
were more expensive and durable as compared to wood.  Building graving docks during 
the turn of the twentieth century took years to complete, frequently taking over a decade.  
The slow pace of construction meant that battleship designs often surpassed a dock’s 
designed capacity before the dock was completed, forcing either an enlargement of the 
drydock or the construction of a new drydock.  Either of these options took more time 
and funds.  The two newest graving docks in 1916 were both completed in 1913 at New 
York Navy Yard and Puget Sound Navy Yard and cost $2,500,000 and $2,300,000 
respectively.
26
  In comparison, the Pennsylvania dreadnought of 1916 cost $11,500,000.
27
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In addition to dry docks there were many shops and storehouses at naval bases.  
Every technical category required in maintaining the new steel navy used shops at the 
installations.  These facilities included machinery and tools to work on hydraulics, 
electrical systems, steam engines, and ordnance.  Several of these shops were located in 
massive buildings that accommodated the large machine tools for building and repairing 
shipboard equipment.  The move towards steel hulls and electrification of warships 
required a corresponding improvement in base shops to maintain the warships.
28
  
However, drydocks were a more telling comparison of the capability of bases to support 
the fleet. 
Base infrastructure during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
adapting to support the rapid improvements found in warship design.  New machine 
tools, new buildings, electrically run workplaces, larger piers and drydocks all were 
necessary improvements to naval bases.  However, ship construction and design outpaced 
the increased capabilities of the bases. The imbalance found in the U.S. Navy in 1916 
required the formation of a commission to examine the state of naval base infrastructure 
and provide suggestions for requisite improvements to support the new fleet envisioned 
by the 1916 naval act.  Naval bases remained the unglamorous portion of the navy and 
languished in relative obscurity, yet, they were essential in the creation of a navy. 
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Chapter 3: Post Spanish-American War Expansion 
During the Spanish-American War, the existing base infrastructure of the United 
States was stretched to its absolute limit and numerous problems arose during debates 
over the need for naval base expansion after the peace settlement.  In reaction to the 
broad geographic areas of naval action during the Spanish American War, the Navy 
called for an expansion of base infrastructure along the Gulf Coast and the creation of 
bases and repair facilities across the Pacific Ocean.  Admiral Dewey’s preparations in 
Hong Kong before sailing for Manila demonstrated the lack of American naval support in 
the Pacific.  He outfitted his ships for the coming conflict before the declaration of war 
based off orders he received from Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt.  
Hong Kong was a colony of Britain with several dry docks and naval shops to support the 
Royal Navy; Dewey used these facilities until war was declared and then repositioned to 
a bay up the Chinese coast and awaited further orders.
29
  In addition, the actions in the 
Caribbean proved that the facilities of the Southeast were inadequate to support a battle 
fleet in waters that the United States viewed as its own.  The voyage of the USS Oregon 
from the west coast around Cape Horn served as a prime example for the strategic 
necessity of building a canal across the Isthmus of Panama.  These three lessons would 
spur the creation of overseas bases. 
Congress appropriated funds for the creation of several naval stations in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific.  These naval stations were to meet the demands of increased 
naval presence abroad.  Overseas naval stations enabled the American fleet to patrol and 
visit distant locations without relying on foreign support.  In time of war or increased 
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operations, these new stations, when properly set up, allowed for repairs and outfitting 
closer to possible areas of operation.  The first wave of these overseas stations was San 
Juan, Puerto Rico; Guam; and Cavite, Philippine Islands which were initiated 
immediately after the conclusion of hostilities in 1898.  The next year, Hawaii was 
annexed and the funding was provided for a naval installation at Pearl Harbor.  Another 
base was established at Tutuila, Samoa in 1900.  Installations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
and Olongapo, on Subic Bay in the Philippines, were established in 1901.
30
  The new 
bases were on United States territory, which helped the Navy to start to gain 
independence of foreign infrastructure and supply chains.   
These overseas bases extended the U.S. Navy’s global support network for the 
fleet’s diverse needs in peace and war, from emergency battle repairs to provisioning 
goodwill missions.   The initial funding for overseas bases in the four years following the 
Spanish-American War totaled $672,715, compared to the total public works spending of 
$19,072,006.
31
  These newly established stations received just 3.5% of the amount of 
improvement money spent on bases.  Further limiting the expenditures for naval base 
expansion overseas was indecision by naval leaders about where to locate bases and lack 
of communication between the naval leaders and Congress.  Without clear direction for 
overseas spending, congressmen focused expenditures on their own constituencies 
allowing the lion’s share of the improvements to continue to go to existing navy yards. 
The case that exemplified the focus on existing installations was Portsmouth 
Navy Yard.  The improvement of Portsmouth demonstrated the importance of policies 
and politicians in naval funding.  Eugene Hale, the chair of the Senate Naval Affairs 
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Committee, sought extra funding for New England.  While there were two other major 
Navy Yards close to Portsmouth, New York and Boston, funding totaling $1,250,000 for 
a new dry dock at Portsmouth was approved in 1899.  While the new dry dock was large 
enough to fit the largest warship, it was discovered after the dock’s completion that the 
channel to it was too shallow.  The dredging operation cost another $1,000,000 to rectify 
this defect.
32
  Within the next three years channel depth again became an issue because of 
increases in the draft of new battleships then on the drawing board.
33
  Portsmouth’s 
expansion baffled even naval officers. In 1908, then Chief of the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks, Admiral Hollyday testified to the House Naval Affairs Committee in regards to 
the large expenditures at Portsmouth.  He answered Congressman Lilley’s question 
“What is the object of your spending any more money on the Navy Yard at Portsmouth?” 
with “As long as we have a navy-yard there we have to spend money on it.”
34
 Hollyday’s 
testimony exemplified the general mood in the Navy.  Existing facilities always required 
funding for maintenance and gainful employment of officers and men.  Previous 
decisions on location of the establishments and their ultimate purpose were rarely 
questioned by officers. 
Along with extending the naval stations to overseas territories, naval leaders 
argued for the establishment of coaling stations.  In 1898 the Coaling Station Board went 
up and down the Atlantic seaboard evaluating locations for coaling stations as well as the 
levels of coal to be stored at the new stations in addition to that maintained at existing 
navy yards and stations.  It recommended establishing a separate coaling station at 
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Frenchmen’s Bay, Maine and providing expanded coal reserves at the naval bases in 
Portsmouth, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C.; Norfolk, and Port 
Royal.  The new fuel depots were necessary to support the Navy’s expanded training 
schedule.
35
  Broad distribution of the stations throughout the United States enabled ships 
to train longer in training areas without the need for extensive collier support or buying 
small amounts of coal at locally higher prices.  Frenchmen’s Bay, Maine was established 
in 1899.  The Bureau of Yards and Docks established independent coaling stations in 
1900 at Melville, Rhode Island and Pichliinque in Baja Mexico; expanding beyond the 
initial recommendations of the board.  In 1904, the last coaling stations were established 
at San Diego, California and Tjburon, California.
36
  The coaling stations met the 
immediate needs of a training fleet in home waters but could not meet wartime 
requirements for the fleet.  Inadequate coaling resources overseas became evident in the 
1907-1908 World Cruise of the Great White Fleet.   
The years following the Spanish-American War saw a massive expansion of naval 
bases and the rise of permanent American naval bases overseas.  These initial moves 
required further development and some unified plan to dictate the levels of support 
facilities around the world.  Yet, the plan never materialized due to several factors that 
caused irregular developments and a focus on existing bases along the American 
seaboard.  Politicians seeking an increase in federal spending in their districts, inter-
service disputes with the Army, and gridlock among naval leaders all influenced the 
continued expansion of naval power, including base expansion and support.  
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Chapter 4: Overseas Expansion 
 Additional naval bases in the Pacific were needed to support an enlarged naval 
presence in peace and the potentially larger forces that would be required in war.  After 
the smashing success against the Spanish at the Battle of Manila Bay in 1898 and the 
subsequent acquisition of the Philippines, the United States began to push an Open Door 
Policy in China.  Secretary of State Hay initially put the Open Door Policy forward in 
1899; it sought to allow all nations free access to trade with China and avoid carving 
China into spheres of influence.
37
  While tensions existed with Britain in the late 
nineteenth century over Venezuela and the possibility of a Panama Canal, relations with 
China were a greater policy challenge for McKinley.
38
   
China’s distance from the United States and the presence of strong naval 
contingents of several great powers weakened the position of American policy 
implementation as compared to the Caribbean.  McKinley considered two solutions to the 
China situation: to impose control of Chinese territory in competition with other Western 
nations, or to promote fair and equal access to the market.  Opting for the latter, the Open 
Door Policy required more political effort than other foreign issues due to the greater 
complexity of competing national interests in the Chinese market.
39
  Because of 
numerous countries seeking spheres of influence in China, the push by the United States 
for an Open Door policy created tension with those nations.  Yet, tension had been 
relieved partially due to American involvement in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion.  
While the U.S. supported Chinese sovereignty they fought alongside European powers in 
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suppressing the Boxers.  This action allowed the American proposal to be partially 
accepted by the European powers. 
In addition to the several European powers with imperial ambitions, Japan posed 
a growing threat to the United States’ objectives in the Pacific.  Japan saw East Asia as 
their sphere of influence alone and considered any Western power that had imperial 
intentions in Asia as an intruder.  Tension rose between Japan and the U.S as American 
diplomats pushed for measures to execute the Open Door Policy.  The American fleet 
was a large factor underpinning policy.  The implementation of greater U.S naval 
presence in the Pacific became the task of Secretary of the Navy John Davis Long.  He 
sought to capitalize on the territorial gains of the Spanish American War, and aimed to 
repair the shortcomings in the naval infrastructure exposed during the war as the 
foundation of substantial naval power projection into East Asia.
40
 
Yet, as the first decade of the twentieth century passed, the relative importance of 
the naval stations was questioned and debated among politicians and naval officers.  
Congress became increasingly reluctant to fund these newly established naval stations.
41
  
The majority of public works funding continued to go to navy yards during the immediate 
years after the establishment of the overseas bases.  In 1902, the recently established 
station on the island of Guam saw funding approved of only $132; the two previous years 
saw only $11,000 appropriated.  The small naval station at New London, Connecticut had 
$10,500 allocated in public works for 1902 alone.
42
  In 1903, Secretary of the Navy 
William Moody, sought increased funding for the overseas bases.  He stated in the annual 
report that there was a large fleet in “Asiatic waters” with “no naval base…nearer than 
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Puget Sound or San Francisco Bay” and the ships depended on the use of foreign owned 
and controlled facilities in Japan and Hong Kong that might not be available during a 
political crisis or in the event of hostilities.
43
  Moody continued, “[w]ithout a sufficient 
naval base of our own in Asiatic waters, the position of our fleet would be untenable.”
44
 
Bases across the Pacific would enable the American fleet to quickly be repaired near a 
probable area of operation as well as to continue routine patrols around the globe. 
Disagreement within the Navy, rivalry with the Army, and lack of political 
support caused further problems for Pacific expansion.  The Philippines were viewed by 
the U.S. as their bastion in the Far East and both services looked to expand and protect 
the islands.  While Cavite Naval Station, in Manila harbor, received the most funding 
initially after the war, as well as the new drydock Dewey, Cavite was deemed too small to 
become the large repair facility envisioned by the naval leaders.
45
   The Navy General 
Board urged the Bureau of Yards and Docks and Congressmen to move the facilities at 
Cavite to Olongapo in Subic Bay.  Leading the charge for the shift to Olongapo was 
Admiral Dewey, hero of the Battle of Manila and President of the General Board.  
Dewey’s support came from lessons based on his victory at Manila. Cavite had proved to 
be defensively weak in its location and defensive structures.  Manila Bay was too small in 
Dewey’s opinion and the base at Cavite had too little land to support the large base 
proposed for the Philippines.  Subic Bay offered a larger sheltered harbor and enough 
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land to support a large base.  Dewey argued that if the Spanish fleet had taken shelter in 
Subic Bay that he would not have been able to defeat them.
46
 
The U.S. Army, however, played a role in determining the location of the naval 
base in the Philippines.  Initially the Army left the decision to the Navy and maintained it 
was solely a naval matter.  In 1906, the Army changed its position in reaction to the 
Russian loss of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War and questions this military 
disaster raised over defense of harbors.
47
  After surveying of the harbors and surrounding 
territory the Army pushed for Manila to be the stronghold of the Philippines, ruling Subic 
Bay too difficult to defend from a landward attack.  They asked the Navy to shift the 
proposed main base to Cavite, since it would fall within the defenses of Manila, thus 
allowing a consolidated fortification plan.  The Navy vehemently opposed the move as 
Subic Bay possessed what it regarded as compelling advantages as a naval base.  Created 
in 1903, the Joint Army-Navy board debated the defense of the Philippines as well as the 
location of the naval base for three years, from 1907 to 1910.  While the debate was 
raging within the board, Congress refused to fund any significant improvements at either 
Cavite or Subic Bay until the Joint Board reached a decision.
48
 
While the debate over the Philippines occupied the Army and Navy, the question 
of Hawaii awaited the outcome of the debate.  Though the Navy insisted that the 
Philippines serve as the anchor of naval presence in the Far East, they also saw use in 
Hawaii as well as Guam.  The key debate around Hawaii was whether a significant or 
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small base would be constructed in the islands.  Hawaii’s strategic location was 
appreciated before the annexation of the islands.  During the Spanish-American War a 
sugar magnate bought up water frontage around Honolulu and all the available coal and 
offered the land and coal to the Navy for use as a coaling station.  After the war the 
coaling station remained.  Pearl Harbor, eight miles west, presented a large sheltered 
harbor, one of the best in Pacific.  By 1903, allocations for the creation of a base at Pearl 
Harbor appeared in the budget; however, the future size remained undetermined.
 49
 
The General Board changed their view of Hawaii in 1907.  They saw Pearl 
Harbor as a great location for a large naval yard.  Included in the 1907 proposal was the 
largest dry dock constructed by the Navy along with all the requisite machine, steam, and 
manufacturing shops to outfit and repair the battle fleet.  With the Philippine debate 
continuing over both where a naval station would be located as well as the level of repair 
ability at the base, Pearl Harbor was seen as an essential base for fleet operations across 
the Pacific.  The General Board saw the importance of a large dock at Pearl Harbor 
regardless of the decision in the Philippines.  Pearl Harbor would either serve as a mid-
ocean naval station for the fleet in conjunction with a large Asiatic base in the Philippines 
or it would act as the furthest naval yard in the Pacific.  With the Board’s arguments 
Roosevelt pushed Congress for funding at Pearl Harbor to build the dry dock.
50
  In 1908 
funding was allocated for the construction of a dry dock with an initial outlay of 
$1,000,000 with another $1,200,000 following the next year.
51
  The push for Pearl Harbor 
raised questions from Congress as to which location, Olongapo or Pearl Harbor, would 
become the main yard in the Pacific.  These questions would not be answered until the 
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Joint Board made their recommendations in 1910.
52
  Pearl Harbor represented the first 
significant expenditure for base improvements outside the coastal United States.  Finally 
an overseas base received funding equivalent to major navy yards in the United States. 
 With Roosevelt’s maneuverings for the creation of the Panama Canal, the 
Caribbean Sea once again rose in prominence in American diplomacy and naval policy.  
In support of securing the Caribbean, President Roosevelt added the Roosevelt Corollary 
to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904.  The corollary stated that the United States would take 
steps to enforce European claims in Latin America rather than European powers enforce 
their own will in the region.  Roosevelt sought to push Europeans to the periphery of 
Latin American affairs replacing them with the United States.
53
  The actions taken by the 
U.S. in Latin America became known as Banana Wars and lasted through the 1930s.  The 
Navy and Marine Corps bore the brunt of the engagements taken throughout the 
Caribbean and naval bases were required to support these forces.
54
   
The existing infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean had been 
inadequate to meet the needs of the battle squadrons during the Spanish-American War.  
To rectify the problems, expansions to existing bases at Key West and Pensacola were 
sought.  A floating dry dock was constructed for the new navy base at Algiers, Louisiana, 
and naval installations in Cuba were agreed upon with the new Cuban government.
55
  
Two bases were sought in Cuba, one on the north side of the island near Havana, and 
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Guantanamo Bay on the south side.  Guantanamo Bay had been captured as a supply 
depot during the blockade of Santiago harbor in the Spanish-American War.  
Guantanamo Bay was seen as a step in remedying shortcomings and allowing American 
squadrons to train and patrol in the Caribbean.
56
  Between 1904-1906, there was a ten-
fold increase in funding for Guantanamo Bay.  By 1906, the base was receiving funding 
comparable to the navy yards in Norfolk and Charleston.
57
   
The General Board recommended building Guantanamo into a large navy yard, 
centered on a dry dock large enough to house the recently commissioned battleships of 
the Kearsarge class.  The board saw the base as a seasonal home for the fleet and as such 
a dry dock large enough to hold the biggest battleship would be needed to conduct 
routine maintenance.  Furthermore the base could be used to outfit a fleet in times of war 
if an enemy sought to attack the planned Panama Canal.  Machine shops, storage 
facilities, and steam plants also appeared in the plan for Guantanamo.  These ideas halted 
as soon as they were envisioned as concerns arose over Guantanamo Bay.
58
  Poor water 
conditions and doubts about the overall defensibility of the proposed grounds caused 
immediate hesitation by politicians and other naval leaders in building up the base.  
Further complicating the question of defense, Cuba ceded only one fifth of the land 
initially requested by the Navy.  Increasing the size of the base was sought to support 
both the size of the facilities and the defense of the base from landward attack.  
Expanding the base boundary grew in importance after the Russo-Japanese War.  The 
same lessons taken from the Japanese attack on the Russians in the Port Arthur that drove 
the Army to push for the naval station at Cavite caused both services to seek further land 
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around Guantanamo.  The Japanese had used the high ground around Port Arthur to 
bombard the Russian positions below, the Army and Navy sought to move the hills 
around Guantanamo Bay within the base boundaries.  The initial terms for the base lease 
from Cuba did not include several hills around the bay.  In subsequent years, the initial 
outlay was not supported by additional funds to complete the planned facilities. 
With the bulk of naval base expenditures in the Caribbean flowing to 
Guantanamo, Key West Naval Station declined temporarily in priority.  During the same 
period of ten-fold increase at Guantanamo, Key West funding fell from $120,000 to just 
$2,000.  Yet the decline in Key West lasted only for a couple of years.  Commodore 
William Beehler argued the case for continued funding and expansion of Key West.  
Commodore Beehler served on the cruiser Montgomery during the Spanish-American 
War, which visited Key West during the conflict to be outfitted.  The experience and 
views seen at Key West during that conflict caused Beehler to appreciate the utility of 
Key West.  Drawing on his wartime experience and later service, he set out an argument 
that Key West and Guantanamo naval bases could work in tandem to secure the 
approaches to the planned Panama Canal.
59
  Along with Beehler’s appeal, Florida 
congressmen added their political and economic arguments for further funding and 
improvements at Key West.  Over the next six years Key West received $296,376 of 
improvements while Guantanamo received no funds past the 1905 allocation.
60
  
Guantanamo Bay’s establishment was almost immediately impeded because of political 
trepidations, diplomatic issues, and the proximity of American states to the base that 
offered more political leverage with respect to the allocation of federal money. 
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When Roosevelt left office, his administration had doubled the number of naval 
bases.  Largely a result of the Spanish-American War, the overseas bases added to the 
inventory marked a significant change in naval policies.  Intended to support American 
diplomacy overseas, either via the Roosevelt Corollary in the Caribbean or the Open 
Door Policy in the Pacific, overseas bases required further development.  Necessary 
funding to build the large overseas repair facilities never materialized during Roosevelt’s 
presidency.  Political infighting and reluctance to build bases that might rival and 
supersede continental bases was a primary factor in the lack of development.  
Contributing to the lack of direction were the debates between the Army and the Navy at 
the Joint Army-Navy board sessions.  Political reluctance continued however and would 
until the outbreak of World War One.
61
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Chapter 5: Coastal Expansion 
While debates and infighting stymied overseas base growth in the Pacific the 
Western coastline received increased attention during the early twentieth century.  For the 
same naval reasons that justified the retention of the Philippines and the annexation of 
Hawaii, additional navy yards were sought along the west coast of the mainland United 
States.  By World War One two navy yards existed, with naval leaders calling for an 
additional third yard.  Dry dock expansion at existing yards, however, did not keep up 
with the growth of the fleet and size of the ships.   Without adequate infrastructure, any 
talk of basing a battle fleet in the Pacific remained speculative at best.  Europe’s arms 
race, economic growth expected in the Caribbean, and the dearth of naval support in the 
Pacific dictated the American battle fleet remain in the Atlantic. 
Until 1891, Mare Island in San Francisco Bay, California, was the only navy yard 
on the Pacific Coast.  In that year, Puget Sound Naval Station, which was situated 840 
miles to the north in Washington State, was founded in order to ease the strain on Mare 
Island.  The new base improved significantly the west coast’s capacity to support a battle 
fleet.  The new naval station’s location across the Puget Sound from Seattle offered deep 
water approaches right to the shore line.  The base contrasted from Mare Island’s location 
at Vallejo with a long channel that was too shallow to accommodate the draft’s of the 
larger battleships coming into service.  Upon the station’s founding, construction started 
on a wooden dry dock, completed in 1896.  Puget Sound’s new dock was larger than the 
existing dock at Mare Island and at the time of completion it was large enough to handle 
the biggest American warship.  While the body of the dock was wood, the entrance was 






  This dry dock freed the U.S. Navy from its former dependence upon dock 
facilities in British Columbia.
63
   
As a newer base, Puget Sound always came second to Mare Island.  During the 
Spanish-American War, Puget Sound played a supporting role to Mare Island.  Puget 
Sound Navy Yard funding was 60% of Mare Island’s funding.  In 1898 with the war 
preparations, Puget Sound received $80,143 while Mare Island received $216,785.
64
  
Following the war, along with the rest of the base expansion movement, Washington 
State congressmen and several naval officers advocated for improvements to Puget 
Sound.  Mordecai T. Endicott, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, opposed any 
expansion in the existing facilities at Puget Sound.  Endicott contended that Mare Island 
was already a highly developed base and increasing facilities at Puget Sound was 
unnecessary.  He felt that Puget Sound was too far from railroads and lacked the local 
industrial and manpower support needed for a large navy yard.  In comparison, Mare 
Island had a granite dry dock large enough to hold the existing coastal battleships.  
Beside the dry dock, Mare Island was close to San Francisco and already contained 
several machine and steam shops.  Mare Island’s dry dock however, was too small to 
service the latest battleships on the drawing board.
65
   
Nonetheless, in the same report Endicott argued for a second navy yard on the 
West Coast.  He stated, “as the Bureau believes, then another site should be sought which 
combines the essential requirements of such a yard.”
66
  A second yard would bring 
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federal funding of a major yard to another location, bring further congressional support 
for naval policies, and eliminated the threat of one enemy action taking out the only 
American naval yard on the West Coast.  The location of the second navy yard became 
the central debate in the Navy and Congress.  Endicott preferred Southern California to 
an expansion of the base at Puget Sound.  In his arguments to Congress he cited the Puget 
Sound’s location, lack of railroad access, and distance from major population centers as 
reasons to support a Southern California base.
67
  According to his recommendations 
Puget Sound would remain open but only at its current level.
68
   
The base commander at Puget Sound, Commander Ambrose Wyckoff, however, 
opposed Endicott’s plan.  He thus formed a committee to enhance Puget Sound’s 
attractiveness to Congress and to argue for its expansion.
69
    Wyckoff went further, and 
personally met congressmen at the railway station and escorted them on a tour of Puget 
Sound while they were on a tour of existing West Coast facilities and proposed 
locations.
70
  These efforts resulted in Puget Sound being designated a navy yard, an 
upgrade from naval station, in 1900 and funds were appropriated to construct a second 
dry dock big enough to berth the largest battleships then on the drawing board.  In 1903, 
Puget Sound achieved rough parity with Mare Island, receiving only 3% less funding 
than its competitor to the south.
71
  This equality in support was not continued in 
subsequent years.  In 1905 Puget Sound’s funding was 30% less than that of Mare 
Island.
72
  Funding issues delayed completion of the additional dry dock until 1913.  
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Nonetheless, improvements to the rest of the yard enabled the yard to handle the modern 
warship designs as well as support future growth in the fleet.
73
 
Puget Sound Navy Yard expanded throughout Roosevelt’s presidency mainly as 
an outgrowth of increased tension in the Pacific.  After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan 
posed a greater threat to the United States position in East Asia in general and the Open 
Door Policy in particular.  While battleships remained in the Atlantic, infrastructure was 
required to support the ships in the event of deployment to the Pacific.
74
  And on the 
opposite coast, the centrality of the Northeast came under fire as numerous naval leaders 
and politicians sought to build navy yards south of Cape Hatteras. 
 A final example of the interaction of politics and base expansion was the case of 
Port Royal and Charleston in South Carolina.  Following the precedent set by Senator 
Hale, Senator Tillman sought to increase naval spending in South Carolina.
75
  The 
existing naval station of Port Royal had been expanded shortly before the outbreak of the 
Spanish-American War.  The base was originally used during the Civil War as a naval 
resupply post for blockading squadrons but was reestablished in 1883 as a naval station.  
Immediately afterwards extensive improvements were made in the creation of repair 
facilities as well storage sheds and barracks.  Capping the improvements at Port Royal 
was the construction of a large wooden dry dock.  Senator Tillman was the main actor in 
securing the funds for the dry dock; he saw the dock purely in terms of increasing federal 
money to South Carolina.  As he stated bluntly, “I am trying to get a little for Port Royal 
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because, if you are going to steal, I want my share.”
76
  The dock was completed in 1895 
just in time to aid in the naval mobilization during the Spanish-American War.
77
  At the 
time of completion the dry dock was capable of handling the largest battleships then in 
commission.  It was, notwithstanding, an unsatisfactory addition for several reasons. 
 Unlike Puget Sound’s stone entranceway to its wooden dry dock, Port Royal’s 
wooden dry dock had no such protection from the elements.  After the Spanish American 
War, Secretary Long and Chief Endicott proposed encasing the dock in stone to prevent 
deterioration by weather and teredoes.  Another major problem was the channel depth 
silting up from the Broad River.  Constant dredging was the only solution to this issue 
and many critics and politicians sought to establish a navy yard elsewhere in the region 
instead of constantly redredging the channel to the dry dock.
78
  In addition, Tillman’s 
political wrangling shifted from beefing up Port Royal to creating a new base at 
Charleston. 
 Senator Tillman sought extra funding for South Carolina.
79
  While he just pushed 
for expanding Port Royal in a similar manner to Hale at Portsmouth, Tillman sought a 
navy base in Charleston to further strengthen his political support.  After he pushed naval 
leaders and the rest of Congress to ignore several shortcomings in the location of Port 
Royal he used those shortcomings to justify the creation of Charleston.  Naval leaders 
viewed Charleston as an improved location as well and threw their support behind the 
creation of the new base.  In the closing years of Secretary Long’s tenure, Tillman’s 
proposal gained traction.  A naval committee was created in 1900 to provide Congress 
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with the relative merits of Tillman’s request.  The committee agreed to establish a navy 
yard in Charleston and congressional approval came in 1901.  Port Royal’s funding that 
year saw over a 50% decrease with the establishment of Charleston Navy Yard.   
As seen with the other base expansion debates, political support for expansion 
was tenuous.  Presidential administrations changed and so did support for Charleston 
Navy Yard.  In 1903, Secretary Moody, the new Secretary of the Navy, argued in 
Congress that the Navy did not desire Charleston and had no business maintaining a base 
there.
80
  But Moody moved onto to become the Attorney General later in 1904 and was 
replaced briefly as Secretary of the Navy by Paul Morton for a year and then Charles 
Bonaparte.  These quick shuffles within President Roosevelt’s cabinet disrupted policy.  
A direct result of this discontinuity was languishing of a decision on the South Carolina 
base debate.
81
  Funding for Port Royal continued to dwindle until reaching $23,000 in 
1903 and then doubled to over $48,000 in 1904 and then shriveled to $5,000 in 1905.  
During the same years, Charleston saw an 800% increase, going from $61,000 in 1903 to 
$494,000 in 1904.  Charleston continued its much higher level of funding after 1904.  In 
1915 Port Royal became Parris Island Marine Corps Training Depot after nearly a decade 
as an under-funded naval installation.
82
  
All of these political anglings to increase funding in a politician’s district drove 
many to see bases in exclusively political terms.  By 1905 the political infighting became 
so rampant that the House Naval Affairs Committee stated: “too often in the past naval 
stations have been located at the behest of local and political influence.  The time has 
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come when naval stations should be located for the best interests of the American Navy 
by men whose business it is to know what the naval service demands.”
83
  Ironically the 
naval leaders tasked with determining these decisions, the General Board, served only in 
an advisory capacity to the Secretary of the Navy.  As seen with the gridlock of the Joint 
Army-Navy Board with the question of the Philippines, the General Board often argued 
within itself on the proper distribution of naval facilities.  While only an advisor to the 
Secretary of the Navy, the board was reluctant to provide specific recommendations 
during the first decade of its existence.  The reluctance stemmed from several reasons.  
First, the board often saw their recommendations overturned by congressional debates.  
Further, the board was only in its infancy having only been established in 1903 after 
decades of debate over the role of a board.  With the numerous secretaries coming 




The decision over Charleston and Port Royal exemplified the political nature of 
base expansion during this period.   With the creation of Charleston Navy Yard in 1901 
Port Royal saw an immediate drop in funding as well as the general suspension of all but 
routine maintenance at the yard.   In contrast to the West Coast debate over Navy Yards, 
the political environment and military leadership decided to build a new yard rather than 
expanding an existing base.  The strength of the political and military lobbying for the 
creation of a new base resulted in Charleston.  On the West Coast a third base would wait 
                                                        
83
 U.S. Congress. House. Naval Affairs Committee, 1904. 58
th
 Cong. 2ns session, February 11., 
13.  
84










                                                        
85
 The Great White Fleet stopped at Puget Sound during its round the world cruise in 1907-1909.  
There were few repairs needed before the trip across the Pacific Ocean.  However, the fleet depended on 
British coal supplies across the globe, receiving majority of it by foreign ships due to the United States 
Navy only owning 2 modern colliers.  George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 47: Navy Yard 





Chapter 6: Taft Presidency 
In 1909, William Taft was sworn in as President and appointed George von 
Lengerke Meyer as the new Secretary of the Navy.  Unlike the numerous men serving as 
the Secretary of the Navy during Roosevelt’s presidency, Meyer served Taft’s entire 
term.  Meyer had worked with Taft in Roosevelt’s administration where Taft was the 
secretary of war and Meyer was the postmaster general.
86
  Indecisions and uncompleted 
debates over naval base expansion carried over from Roosevelt’s presidency.  Taft’s 
inaugural address stated there was a requirement for “a suitable Army and a suitable 
Navy,” and he would address any situation “growing out of the Open Door and other 
issues.”
87
  During his presidency, however, Taft never specified what constituted a 
‘suitable navy.’  Taft’s administrative policies shed no further light on these definitions.  
During the four years of Taft’s administration naval budgets went from $124,618,800 to 
$130,644,900.  Yet, national expenditures outstripped the growth of the naval budget, 
causing the percentage of the national budget spent on the Navy to decrease from 21% to 
18%.
88
  One of the causes of this shift was the result of a change in congressional control.   
As the Democratic Party rose in power during Taft’s presidency the military 
represented an area that could be cut in order to support their own programs.  
Additionally, the Progressive Movement gained supporters from both parties, building on 
the legacies of anti-trust and anti-corruption of Roosevelt’s presidency.
89
  Growing 
divisions in Congress forced the Navy to prioritize which programs to push the most to a 
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greater extent than in the past.
90
  Once again battleships remained the focus due to the 
practice of ranking international power by the size of the battle fleet.  The European 
dreadnought race was heating up and the strides Roosevelt made in battleship 
construction were not enough to keep up with Britain and Germany.  Britain’s battleship 
building was determined by the two power standard.  The standard was enshrined in the 
Naval Defense Act of 1889 and dictated that Britain maintain a battleship fleet ten 
percent larger than the next two powers’ fleet combined, while the British cruiser fleet 
maintained a higher superiority.
91
  Yet, the focus of their plans was now on Germany.  
Taft faced a growing challenge by Democrats over the U.S. attempting to keep up with 
the European nations.  Naval base building once again was pushed further back in 
priority as funding debates grew.  Many of the initial outlays in naval base expansion 
were not followed up with continued public works funding causing a decline in naval 
infrastructure throughout Taft’s presidency.
 92
    
Unlike Roosevelt, who largely directed policy and administration while the 
Secretary of the Navy dealt with the management of patronage, Taft left Meyer together 
with the bureau chiefs and the General Board on their own.  Though the Navy possessed 
a stable leadership, the shift in Congress hampered efforts for steady naval funding, 
resulting in work stoppages.
93
  While long term contracts offered approved funding over 
several years, ideal for ship construction and large public works improvements at naval 
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bases, the normal form of naval funding remained yearly appropriations.  Stoppages were 
caused primarily by the lack of continued yearly funding for projects.
94
   
Larger docks had been authorized during Roosevelt’s administration at League 
Island, Norfolk, and Puget Sound to match the rapid growth in size of battleships.  All of 
these works faced delays that caused several of these docks to take eight years to 
complete.
95
  While naval base commanders and their superior officers pleaded for 
consistent fiscal support from Congress, they faced continual shortfalls in funding.  Long 
terms contracts, as seen with ship contracts, were once again sought for large naval base 
improvements.  These contracts would have allowed the infrastructure to catch up with 
the increasing dimensions and numbers of battleships.
 96
 
Though his administration failed to ensure continual funding of the in progress 
dry docks, Meyer’s principle influence was reforming the department in ways that made 
the operations of the Navy more businesslike.
 
 The Swift Board was established soon 
after Meyer took office.  The board was tasked with investigating naval organization and 
methods to improve efficiency.  These improvements were aimed at reducing operating 
costs.  Cutbacks in expenses were sought in order to liberate more funds for increases in 
battleship construction.  Infrastructure improvements would only be added if the 
reductions were large enough.  As in Roosevelt’s presidency, battleships remained the 
priority.
97
   Released in October 1909, the report contained numerous recommendations 
for naval infrastructure changes.   
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The most significant recommendation contained in the report concerned base 
closures.  Comparisons between the United States and Britain indicated that the U.S. had 
too many naval bases.  While the British had the largest fleet in the world the Royal Navy 
had only five Royal Dockyards, the United States’ fleet ranked third in the world and the 
Navy had eight navy yards and two large naval stations.
98
  This comparison to Britain 
was simplistic and ignored the global nature of British naval bases.  The Royal Navy had 
eight dockyards in Great Britain, an additional twenty-one dockyards overseas, and nine 
coaling stations overseas as well.  The board held that an excess of bases resulted in 
inefficient use of appropriations.
99
  While base closures were recommended, specific 
recommendations for which base to close did not appear in the report leaving the question 
to the General Board to supply recommendations of which bases to close with 
congressional approval.   
The Swift Board sought to answer the question of who to blame for the excess of 
bases.  The report took a different stance on who to blame for the inconsistent base 
policies than the House Naval Affairs Committee had taken in 1906.  In 1910, the report 
found the uncoordinated nature of yard expansion and improvements was a result of 
individual yard commanders’ self-promotion, resulting in duplication and excessive 
redundancy in infrastructure.
100
  The General Board acted on the Swift Report and largely 
agreed with the findings.  At the same time the Joint Board also ruled that Subic Bay 
would only remain as a small repair facility and that the Philippines could not be fully 
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defended from a large scale attack.
101
  With Hawaii now the main base in the Pacific 
Ocean, the U.S. had effectively withdrawn almost 5,000 nautical miles across the Pacific.   
Based off General Board recommendations, Meyer’s 1910 Annual Report called 
for the closure of the naval bases at New Orleans, Pensacola, San Juan, Port Royal, New 
London, Culebra, and Cavite.
102
 Further guidance from naval leaders included the 
transport of the resources at Pensacola and New Orleans to Guantanamo Bay to expand 
the facilities there.  Reasoning behind the recommendation was based off of business 
practices intended to allow the Navy to run more efficiently.  The 1910 recommendations 
Meyer made were not acted on in their entirety.  Meyer experienced congressional 
pushback from Florida and Louisiana congressmen who sought to maintain their states’ 
naval funding.  In 1912, San Juan and Culebra were shuttered and Pensacola and New 
Orleans were open only for the lightest repairs and maintained at the most basic level.
103
  
Coaling stations were also considered for closures.  Decisions were not reached until a 
year after Meyer took office.  Along with the base closures in 1912 Frenchmen’s Bay, 
Maine and New London, Connecticut coaling stations were closed.
104
  
Guantanamo Bay did not see the expansion called for under the 1910 
recommendations.  After a decade of debate over the relative merits of Guantanamo the 
base was designated as an Emergency Repair Facility in 1911.  During that year the base 
was moved across the bay to Toro Cay as well and only a few permanent structures were 
built.  None of the machinery shops were actually moved from Pensacola and New 
Orleans.  The large base envisioned for Guantanamo during Roosevelt’s presidency was 
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abandoned in favor of leaving Guantanamo just as a limited facility to support the 
training of the fleet in peace as opposed to operations in war.
105
 
Navy yards saw sharp reductions in funding at the same time as Meyer sought to 
shed naval stations.  From 1910 to 1911, League Island Navy Yard in Philadelphia saw a 
50% reduction in funds and Mare Island experienced an 80% reduction.  On the other 
hand, several bases saw boosted funding during the same period.  These yards were on 
the east coast and received the benefit of the precedent set by previous administrations, 
emphasizing naval yards in the Northeast.  New York Navy Yard’s funding increased 
50% and Norfolk Navy Yard received almost a three-fold increase in funding.
106
  The 
largest base improvement allocation was for the establishment of Pearl Harbor as the 
main Pacific Ocean naval base.  In 1911, Pearl Harbor received $2,500,000 in 




While initially the navy yards faced only funding cuts under Meyer’s tenure they 
soon faced closure recommendations as well.  In both 1911 and 1912 reports, Meyer 
advocated that only two navy yards were required on the East Coast once the Panama 
Canal opened.
108
  The recommendation was supported by the Joint Army-Navy Board’s 
findings of 1912.  Guantanamo Bay would become an essential rendezvous station and 
repair facility for the fleet.  Key West would remain open as the main station for torpedo 
boats and would secure the approaches to the canal and the Gulf of Mexico in 
conjunction with Guantanamo Bay.  Charleston would become the secondary home of 
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torpedo boat squadrons.  Two navy yards large enough to shelter the entire fleet as well 
as dry dock the largest battleships were required, one at Norfolk, Virginia, and one north 
of Delaware.  New York was retained as the primary yard due to her size and location; 
however League Island was to be kept operational.   
An underlying reason League Island remained open was her unique freshwater 
basin.  While other naval bases had basins none had the lack of salt water in them as 
League Island due to her distance up the Delaware River.  The lack of salt water kept the 
steel hulls in a better state of preservation compared to those kept in the brackish waters 
found at other bases.
109
 League Island was just one of several bases that were kept open 
either due to their unique features or the power of the local congressmen.  Closing navy 
bases proved more difficult than the General Board or Meyer thought. 
While he attempted to shutter bases on the East Coast, Meyer sought a new base 
along the Pacific coast.  The base was intended to support the fleet on its annual cruise in 
the Pacific after the completion of the Panama Canal.  Appearing in the 1910 report was a 
recommendation for the establishment of a base in San Francisco Bay to allow deep-
water draft ships to be repaired in the area.  An examination by the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks found the channel to Mare Island Navy Yard too shallow for over fifty vessels of 
the fleet, including all of the modern battleships.
110
  To dredge the channel deep enough 
for these ships, an initial expenditure of $900,000 was required.  Not considered in the 
initial outlay for dredging the Mare Island channel was the cost of maintaining the 
channel on an annual basis, estimated at $70,000.
111
  With the continual cost of 
maintaining a deep channel to Mare Island as the cornerstone, Secretary Meyer proposed 
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a base at San Francisco.
112
  San Francisco offered a large harbor with a fairly deep depth, 
the drawback was that much of the shoreline land was already privately occupied.   
The concept of restructuring the administration of bases in the United States was 
drawn from British experiences.  Secretary Meyer toured Britain in 1909 and brought 
several lessons back to the department, including the streamlining of navy base 
administration.
113
  A concerted effort was made to combine departments and 
administrative functions during this time period.  In the Bureau of Yards and Docks, 
clerks and draftsmen were consolidated into one group.  Central offices were created at 
Norfolk, Mare Island, and Puget Sound in lieu of several different offices for the different 
tradesmen and office workers.
114
  All of these efforts were aimed to reduce the manpower 
required by the bureau, allowing the pay savings to be moved to infrastructure 
modernization.   
Established at the same time, the position of Director of Navy Yards combined all 
the offices that navy yards reported to at the Navy Department.  Prior to the Director of 
Navy Yards, three separate bureaus, Construction and Repair, Docks and Yards, and 
Steam Engineering all received reports from bases as well dictating separate areas of base 
operations.  The old method resulted in the commandant of a base reporting to three 
offices and often receiving orders contrary to one another.  Part of the old divisions 
remained in the consolidated base administration; the primary remnant was the separation 
of the hull and mechanical shops.  The hull shop remained focused solely on hull fittings 
and maintenance while the mechanical shop kept abreast of all the numerous 
technological innovations in heating, cooling, and hydraulic systems found in the new 
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ships.  Leaving the shops separate increased production due in part to allowing the 
employees to remain specialized.
115
 
Base closures and the streamlining of base administration were enacted in an 
effort to reduce costs as naval funding diminished.  Meyer retained, to a large extent, the 
battleship program of Roosevelt.  To keep ship construction fully funded, fewer funds 
were available to expand infrastructure to keep the fleet in commission.  All of these 
changes were done while the Republicans lost control of Congress to the Democratic 
Party.  In 1911, the Democrats gained control of the House of Representatives and the 
Republican majority in the Senate diminished to very nearly equality.
116
  With the 
proportion of funds available for new ship construction dwindling due to the shift to other 
domestic items, naval leaders and Congressional navalists kept their focus on fighting for 
more money for new ships.  Ships remained the top priority as they were viewed as the 
direct measure of naval strength.  At the same time the portion of funding allocated to 
bases varied over the four year term and ship repair funds decreased.
117
  Taft’s 
administration saw rapid changes made to naval organization and bureaucracy while 





                                                        
115
 DON, Annual Report 1910. 
116
 Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 332-333. 
117
 Tillman, Navy Yearbook 530-545; DON, Annual Reports 1910-1912. 
118




Chapter 7: Wilson Presidency 
In 1913, Woodrow Wilson was sworn in as President.  He appointed Josephus 
Daniels as the Secretary of the Navy.  Daniels, a former newspaper owner, received 
approval from William Jennings Bryant and Colonel Edward M. House, two central 
advisors of Wilson, before his appointment.
119
  Under the new administration the first 
policy statement came from the 1913 annual report, Daniels stated that the Navy would 
“save ashore for expenditure afloat.”
120
   Yet, over the next several years Daniels took a 
bipolar approach to naval infrastructure.  One of his biggest targets in reductions was 
base buildings and hospitals.  Expansion of repair and dock facilities, however, became a 
major concern for Daniels after his spring 1913 tour of bases across the U.S.  He realized 
that Meyer’s focus on ship construction had led to deficiencies ashore.
121
  In 1913, there 
was only one navy yard capable of constructing a battleship, that being New York Navy 
Yard.  However, at the end of the same paragraph in his 1913 annual report, Daniels 
stated, “In any matters of doubt as to whether an estimate should be made for money to 
be expended ashore or afloat, I have resolved the doubt in favor of increasing the strength 
of the Navy afloat.”
122
  The declared focus on ship construction remained central to naval 
policy as it had in both Roosevelt’s and Taft’s presidencies.  Daniels’ reiteration of the 
battleship first position of the previous administrations meant the United States Navy 
remained focused on fleet expansion at the expense of operational capability.
123
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Daniels reversed the standing view on shipbuilding at navy yards.  Meyer’s 
administration had moved away from new construction at navy yards as they felt the 
private sector was cheaper and more efficient.  Daniels’ administration thought healthy 
competition between navy yards and private yards kept both running efficiently and 
reduced construction costs.  While only one battleship, New York, was authorized for 
construction at a navy yard under Meyer’s tenure, Daniels authorized three battleships at 
navy yards within two years of taking office.
124
  Arizona and Tennessee were authorized 
in 1913 and 1914 respectively for construction at New York Navy Yard and California, 
sister ship of Tennessee, at Mare Island.  Also in 1914, Mare Island was to construct two 
fuel ships while League Island received orders to build a transport and the Boston Navy 
Yard was to build a supply ship.
125
 
In his 1914 annual report, Daniels defended the move towards construction at 
navy yards.  He pointed to the construction of the New York as an example of the 
advantages of direct naval construction.  New York was laid down at the New York Navy 
Yard four and a half months after her sister ship, Texas, which was being built at 
Newport News Shipyard, yet passed her sea trials several weeks earlier than the Texas.  
Costs were also less at the navy yard: $650,000 under the contracted price, saving 
approximately 30%.
126
 A report attributed a portion of the cost reduction and savings in 
building time to direct naval inspections throughout the construction and faster 
turnaround times between trials.  A private yard contract vessel required separate trips by 
inspectors for both assessments and trials.  These separate visits created delays in 
construction; only after a mistake was corrected would the next visit be scheduled.  This 
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system resulted in increased travel expenses and time delays.  The report also explained 
that the previous administration’s move away from navy yard ship construction had been 
based off of the inclusion of overhead costs, such as salaries for management and 
designers and building maintenance, into construction expenditures at navy yards, while 
the same overhead costs were not always factored into bids from private yards.
127
 This 
difference in calculating bids led to private yards consistently under-bidding the navy 
yards. 
Moving construction back to navy yards required keeping these bases up to 
modern standards and having dry docks large enough to hold the newly designed 
battleships.  With Congress incapable of putting aside political differences, Daniels 
sought to define the base infrastructure needs of the planned fleet.  Daniels looked to 
Europe for precedents.  He discovered that judging relative naval power in terms of ships 
and the numbers of bases wasn’t enough.  What was required was an analysis of 
facilities.  A main area that proved lacking was dry docks. While the United States had 
eleven naval shipyards, Germany had three, and Great Britain had six.  Yet, the total 
length of the dry docks in the United States was only an eighth of Britain’s home royal 
dockyards.
 128
  While there were numerous navy yards, the Navy had not built them up to 
meet their intended purpose.  In the 1914 report, the part of the navy yard in naval policy 
was delineated as, “Navy yards have, as a rule, been located and developed to meet the 
possible requirements of the fleet in time of war, and the plant available is much in 
excess of that required for ordinary peace-time condition.”
129
  Excess operating capacity 
during peacetime was crucial for yards.  Wartime demands for base infrastructure could 
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not be rushed into existence unlike manpower and certain supplies.  Pier accommodations 
and outfitting services were essential to repairing and fitting out vessels during a time of 
conflict, and demand would greatly exceed that of peacetime.  While in peacetime the 
demands for base services were scheduled out over the course of a year or more, wartime 
demands were immediate and often unpredictable. 
In spite of the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, the political will in the U.S. to 
build bases adequate to meet the demands of war continued to lag.   Battleships still 
provided a more tangible measure of naval strength for both politicians and their 
constituents and the building program begun under Roosevelt continued while base 
improvement continued to languish.  The imbalance in number of yards and capabilities 
was a direct outgrowth of a deficiency in oversight on naval base expansion.  Political 
infighting further hampered expansion of the infrastructure.  Oftentimes politicians with 
bases in their constituencies pressured the rest of congress to approve appropriations for 
their bases.  One senator in 1914 retorted, “I have never failed in 18 years to vote for the 
appropriations for the Charleston Navy Yard, knowing all the time that I could not get an 
adjournment of Congress until I did so.”
130
  With these impasses and the pressure to build 
battleships, bases remained disproportionately located on the Northeast coast, and 
overseas bases remained too small to support wartime repairs and outfitting.  Base 
infrastructure improvements remained at record lows and continued to decrease below 
the expenditures of 1898.
131
 
Based on tours of naval stations during his first year in office, Daniels reversed 
the movement to close naval bases, reopening several bases to support new kinds of naval 
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  Pensacola, while superfluous in support of a fleet in the Caribbean 
with the growth of Guantanamo Bay and Key West, became the headquarters of the 
fledgling naval air service.
133
  An aviation board recommended Pensacola as an 
aeronautical station in 1913.  The board was appointed to examine the matter of aviation 
for naval purposes and advise on actions to develop the field in the Navy.
134
  Arriving at 
Pensacola in January of 1914, USS Mississippi anchored in the harbor and off-loaded 
aircraft and equipment that had been at Greenbury Point in Annapolis.  The men of the 
Mississippi went to work renovating the existing buildings and built new shelters and 
ramps for the seaplanes. With the gently sloped beach, ideal for launching seaplanes, and 




Submarines, while existing since the American Revolution, emerged as viable 
warships during the start of the twentieth century.   During the first decade of the 
twentieth century, all American submarine construction occurred in private yards.  These 
yards included Fore River in Quincy Massachusetts, Union Iron Works in San Francisco 
California, Lake in Bridgeport Connecticut, and Crescent in Elizabeth New Jersey.
136
  
Expenditures on submarine rose at an alarming pace during the first decade of 
development resulting in Daniels deciding to build a submarine at a navy yard.  The 
lessons learned from the construction of the New York played a part in the decision.  
Once again, Daniels sought to spur competition between private yards and navy yards.  
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Two private companies, Electric Boat and Lake Torpedo Boat, were the only companies 
designing American submarines and selling their designs to a select group of private 
shipyards for completion.
137
  Reversing Meyer’s proposal to sell off Portsmouth Navy 
Yard, Daniels assigned the construction of L-8 to the yard so that the Navy could gain 
direct experience in submarine design and construction.
138
  The experience not only 
continued to engender competition and promote cost efficiency, it enabled the Navy to 
design their own submarines later.
139
  Once again Daniels saw ship construction during 
peacetime at navy yards as essential to both cost efficiency and gainfully employing 
facilities that during peacetime would otherwise have been inactive and thus wasted. 
Though the shift towards building ships at navy yards forced improvements at the 
major navy yards along the U.S. seaboard, overseas bases, which did not engage in ship 
construction, lagged in development.  Guantanamo, once forecasted to become a naval 
base rivaling those found in Charleston and Puget Sound, languished for lack of 
consistent funding.  The planned dry dock had been started but halted due to lack of 
money.  The existing shops were too small to support a battle fleet in the harbor.  One 
observer, Robert Nesser, remarked that sailors had to pitch tents to stay ashore when the 
ships were in the port.  Nesser reasoned that Guantanamo’s location meant that it lacked 
political support as it was not on American soil.
140
  All overseas bases faced similar 
issues since their establishment after the Spanish-American War.  Increased attention 
towards what constituted an adequate level of base infrastructure would follow in late 
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1916 as Congress passed the Navy Act of 1916, except base funding decreased at a 





Chapter 8: Naval Act of 1916 
In response to the threat of involvement in major hostilities, the United States set 
in place the massive building program of the Naval Act of 1916.  The Naval Act called 
for the construction of ten battleships, six battlecruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty 
destroyers, nine fleet and fifty-eight coastal submarines, and eleven auxiliary vessels.
141
  
Hailed by many as the final step towards a “Navy Second to None,” the bill raised serious 
questions about the unbalanced nature of the Navy and its ability to support the planned 
battle fleet.  Officers and politicians all sounded a call for a complete overhaul of naval 
infrastructure.  While the bill was in deliberation in Congress, many in and connected to 
the Navy pushed for a corresponding increase in naval base budgets. 
Funding for naval bases decreased by 30% from 1914 to 1916, from $4,348,000 
to $3,042,000 in total spending.
142
  After the passage of the Naval Act of 1916, 
appropriated funds for 1917 for base improvements rose 270% to $8,330,000.
143
   Naval 
base capacity was required to meet the needs of the fleet expected in the next five years 
and continuous funding of base expansion was essential.   The estimate for 1918 funds 
required to support the growing fleet was just over $13 million, an increase of 60% over 
1917.
144
  Daniels’ administration stated that the shipbuilding program dictated the 
necessity for this expansion of bases and the expansion could not be delayed due to the 
time required to build the facilities.
145
 
As the Naval Act of 1916 was being drafted during 1915 and 1916, articles 
addressing naval bases rose dramatically in number in the Naval Institute’s Proceedings.  
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These articles were written by both naval officers and civilian employees.  The core of 
their arguments revolved around the lack of adequate support for the fleet.  While there 
had been a steady stream of battleships launched over the past two decades, shore-based 
maintenance and logistical capacity had fallen behind.  Numerous articles focused on the 
inadequacy of overseas base facilities growth.  The authors realized that a battle fleet 
needed the large facilities overseas more than they needed them at home.  Officers cited 
the British as the example to follow.  Since their Naval Defense Act of 1889 requiring a 
two-power standard, the British built not only the largest battle fleet, far surpassing the 
next navy; they built the flotilla craft and naval infrastructure to support the fleet.  British 
naval bases were distributed from the British Isles to every corner of the British 
Empire.
146
  These bases were not scaled to peacetime use, but for wartime demands.  
During peacetime the Royal Navy lightly used many of these facilities, though several 
other navies, including the United States, benefitted from these bases as well.
147
   
Released in 1916, The Navy as a Fighting Machine was aimed at setting forth 
several answers to the debates revolving around the Navy Act.  The book’s author, Rear 
Admiral Bradley Fiske, had already served as the Aide for Inspections to Secretary 
Meyer and was currently the Aide for Operations, the predecessor office to the Chief of 
Naval Operations, for Secretary Daniels.  Fiske’s book detailed the several areas of a 
navy that enabled it to serve its nations policies and fight an enemy on the ocean.  
Chapters included naval defense, policy, preparedness, reserves, and design.  A key 
chapter was Fiske’s exposition on the necessity of naval bases.  He states “To furnish the 
                                                        
146
 Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1916), 317-320. 
147
 Henry C. Davis. “Building Programs and Naval Bases.” Proceedings 42, no. 2 (1916); A. W. 




means of supplying and replenishing the stored-up energy required for naval operations is 
the office of naval bases.”
148
  Subsequent arguments included the need for large navy 
yards that could dock the largest battleships both in home waters and abroad.  Fiske 
recognized that no base could truly be perfect but several served as examples for the rest 
of the world.   These examples included Hong Kong, Gibraltar, and Malta.  Fiske pointed 
out that these bases were outside of British home waters and were close to possible 
operational areas.
149
  In the end, Fiske’s work served as a treatise on how to build a navy 
and enabled other naval leaders to comprehend the push for base expansion.    
Along with Fiske’s book, retired Rear Admiral John R. Edwards submitted a 
report to Congress detailing the importance of navy bases.  Edwards made several 
arguments against the battleship heavy policy the Navy and Congress had pursued since 
the Spanish-American War.  He stated that the relative strength of a navy could not be 
based off of battleship numbers, but that naval strength was better measured by 
considering the other elements of the fleet and the naval infrastructure necessary to 
support the entire force.  As with Fiske, Edward’s insisted this support had to not only be 
in home waters but overseas as well.  Edwards insisted that bases were not maintained 
appropriately, the existing dry docks were too few and too small, and finally that the base 
distribution across the United States and her overseas territories was unbalanced and too 
heavy in the Northeast.
150
  The clamoring of Rear Admiral Fiske, fellow naval officers, 
and the Edwards’ report caused Congress to appoint a board to review the basing 
questions in conjunction with the Naval Act of 1916. 
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The Navy Yard Commission of 1916 was a direct result of questions surrounding 
naval bases arising during the debate for the naval act that set the Navy on a course to 
become the largest navy in the world.  The commission toured both coasts and surveyed 
existing yards and stations as well as surveying for new yards.  A central question for the 
commission was where a third yard should be established on the Pacific Coast.  The 
board made a final recommendation for San Diego.  The report included sections for 
submarines and aviation as well.  These sections were the next steps following the initial 
moves to Portsmouth and Pensacola of determining the requirements for these new 
branches of the naval service.  Groton became the heart of the submarine service, 
primarily due to the proximity to Electric Boat Company and Portsmouth Navy Yard.  
Pensacola remained the training center for naval aviation established three years 
earlier.
151
  The commission report reflected the realization by the Navy Department and 
Congress of the dismal state of naval bases compared to the battle fleet. 
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Chapter 9: Dry Docks 
While the size of battleships rapidly increased during the “New Navy” period 
sizes and numbers of dry docks had not kept up.  The heart of any yard or station, dry 
docks offered not only a place to construct ships in the major navy yards around the 
Northeast, but also repair and upkeep facilities for the fleet.  From major battle damage to 
regular bottom cleaning, dry docks remained essential to the Navy.  While the number of 
navy yards was used an indicator of support capability, the number and dimensions of dry 
docks were the more telling measure.  The United States consistently lagged behind Great 
Britain in dry dock numbers and dimensions.  Further, the United States did not expand 
or construct new dry docks to provide the capability to accommodate the largest ships on 
the drawing board.  The danger posed by the inadequacy of existing docks was 
exacerbated by the fact that dry docks took longer to build than the battleships they were 
to dock, which meant shortfalls could not be remedied quickly.  At the outbreak of World 
War One, the American fleet had no overseas dry docking capability for their largest 
ships, leaving them at the mercy of either allies or luck in battle. 
Battleships had grown rapidly from the turn of the century until World War One.  
Composing the main battle line at the Battle of Santiago were the Indiana class coastal 
battleships. By 1916, the Pennsylvania class dreadnought battleship was coming into 
commission.  These two classes were as far apart in size and technology as World War 
Two destroyers and their modern successors. Within ten years the largest ships of the 
U.S. Navy had doubled their displacement, added 33% to their length and 25% to their 
beam.  These increases outpaced dry dock construction and expansion.
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Along with the rise of battleship sizes, the armored cruiser had pushed several dry 
docks out of use by 1904.  The new Pennsylvania armored cruiser of 1903 exceeded 500 
feet in length for the first time in the American fleet, a length that would not be seen until 
the Delaware class battleship in 1910.   The length forced her to dock only at the new 
docks at Portsmouth, Boston, and Puget Sound.  Though smaller in terms of displacement 
and breadth, the cruisers proved problematic in maintenance terms.  By 1906, the 
Connecticut class battleships had grown too wide for Portsmouth, leaving only the dry 
docks at Boston and Puget Sound capable of docking the largest ships in the American 
fleet.   
Authorized between 1902 and 1905, three dry docks were under construction in 
New York, Charleston, and Norfolk.  These new docks could accommodate the largest 
ships contemplated at the time.  The increasing drafts of the battleships forced 
Portsmouth, Mare Island, and New York to either dredge deeper channels or not be able 
to support the largest ships. While New York had the most dry docks of any yard, her 
location became problematic.  There was no more expansion room for the yard and the 
approaches required significant dredging to support the larger ships.  The dry dock that 
Senator Tillman wanted for Charleston was completed shortly after the Delaware class 
was commissioned.  By 1912, it had difficulties accommodating new ships.  Within 6 




With the Pennsylvania class battleship the same problem arose, with several yards 
being inaccessible to the new battleship.  Mare Island, Boston, Portsmouth and 
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Charleston could not accommodate the class.   Boston’s dry dock was less than a decade 
old and while Portsmouth’s dry dock was large enough, the channel was once again too 
shallow for the ships to enter.  Pearl Harbor broke the trend of building dry docks that 
were quickly surpassed by ship construction.   Pearl Harbor’s dry dock faced a significant 
delay when part of the dock collapsed in 1913 and set back the completion of the dock 
until 1919.  Until the completion of Pearl Harbor’s dock, the only dry dock overseas was 
the floating drydock Dewey at Subic Bay.  Though the number of docks at American 
naval bases almost doubled, from ten in 1898 to eighteen in 1916, their physical size did 
not keep up with the rapid size increases seen in the battleships.  Their distribution among 
naval bases remained clustered around the Northeast and the four navy yards in the 
region. 
In comparison, the British Royal Navy led the world not only in their battle fleet 
size but the number of dry docks and their physical dimensions. These docks were spread 
throughout the empire, enabling support of any ship around the world.  Their dry dock 
capacity was roughly 9 times greater than the U.S. and the majority of their dry docks lay 
outside the British Isles.  Between the six royal dockyards in Britain there were twenty-
two dry docks.  Portsmouth had the most dry docks, six, including two large graving 
docks measuring 850 feet long.  The total length of all the dry docks in the U.S. was 
11,500 feet, just over 2.5 times the length of the total length of the six dry docks at 
Portsmouth.  The difference in overseas capabilities was even more disparate.  The U.S. 
had a total of eight yards while Britain had twenty-one dockyards abroad.  Every one of 
the dockyards contained at least one dry dock with Malta and Singapore both having five 




royal dockyards the Royal Navy had a grand total of forty-four dry docks in comparison 
to eighteen in the U.S.
154
   
The comparisons during Taft’s administration focused on only the number of 
yards and overlooked the key factor in supporting the fleet, dry docks.  During Wilson’s 
presidency the comparison metric changed to the size and number of dry docks.  The shift 
in evaluation revealed a large deficiency in naval infrastructure.  While the U.S. largely 
ignored overseas bases, Britain built enough yards to support a fleet across her empire as 
well as at home.  With the majority of docks along the East Coast, the battle fleet could 
not operate for long duration outside of the Atlantic Seaboard, leaving the increasingly 
outdated armored cruisers to operate in the Pacific.  Only after the Russo-Japanese War 
did the American battle fleet operate in the Pacific, during the Great White Fleet cruise of 
1907-1909.  The cruise was aimed at answering the debate surrounding the question of 
the fleet operating in the Pacific to counter Japanese aggression.  After the fleet returned 
to Norfolk in 1908, the true weakness of American naval infrastructure in the Pacific was 
revealed.  Though hailed as a success the Great White Fleet cruise demonstrated the 
neglect and dysfunctional nature of political support for overseas and West Coast bases.  
At the heart of the problem was the battle fleet outgrowing dry docks.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 As the American fleet grew during the early twentieth century, naval bases and 
their facilities also improved to support the fleet.  While the number of bases and size and 
number of dry docks increased, they did not keep up to the pace of growth seen in the 
battleship force. Requirements to meet national policy and potential threats in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific led to the expansion of bases in both areas.  Following the 
Spanish-American War, overseas naval bases were rapidly established to meet the 
shortcomings observed during the conflict.  There was no unified plan in the 
establishment of the bases, a direct result of naval officers and politicians acting 
independently with no oversight by committees or naval leaders.  Expansion abroad was 
largely based only on lessons from the Spanish-American War and not on anticipated 
future operations.  Domestic bases saw improvements as well, based largely on political 
demands.  The Navy gained immense prestige from the war, but the actions following the 
war were not informed by naval considerations of future needs. 
Pride in the Navy was not limited to naval officers; it also existed in numerous 
politicians.  Throughout Roosevelt’s presidency many congressmen sought a navy 
“second to none.”  These included Senators H.C. Lodge, J.L. Rawlings, and W.B. 
Heyburn and Representatives C.K. Wheeler, S.E. Mudd, and J.F. Talbot.
155
  All of these 
congressmen tied the attainment of first rank in naval power status to America having a 
two-ocean fleet.  By the end of Roosevelt’s presidency the state of naval bases ranged 
across the board from a few buildings around an anchorage to large navy yards with new 
dry docks under construction.  Domestic bases, having the support of the elected 
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representatives of interested parties, were the biggest beneficiaries of the base funding 
made available by the Roosevelt administration.  Overseas bases lagged behind the 
domestic bases, due in part to the lack of initial planning for the expansion of base 
infrastructure after the Spanish-American War.
156
 
Under Taft’s administration, the battleship program continued at a similar pace as 
under Roosevelt.  While the requests for base closures and restructuring made by 
Secretary of the Navy Meyer were never fully implemented, the slowdown in naval base 
modernization and expansion exacerbated the gulf forming between naval facilities and 
the fleet.  Dreadnoughts continued to be laid down while the facilities were already 
overtaxed by the increase in size of new battleships and only piecemeal actions were 
taken to increase base facilities.
157
  Wilson’s administration initially continued the focus 
on ship construction, yet with the Naval Act of 1916, the state of naval bases gained 
increasing attention albeit without increased funding.   Debates surrounding the bill 
during 1915 brought the lagging base support to the forefront of the discussion.  Naval 
officers and politicians began to understand that constructing a fleet was not the same as 
creating a world class navy. 
Fiscal constraints prompted the Navy to establish organizations to implement 
measures that provided economy as well strategic support required of the fleet.  Over 
time, bases across the Pacific and Caribbean were closed or reduced in size as a result of 
the systematic approach of revising the expansion of naval infrastructure.  These moves 
were made in opposition to naval strategists, who wanted these bases to have large 
facilities and docks to support wartime outfitting and repairs of a battle fleet operating far 
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from coastal America.  Reversing this downward trend in naval bases required a massive 
shipbuilding program for Congress and the Navy Department to realize the inadequacy of 
base infrastructure.  Bases needed to be able to support the new ships being built, in both 
normal steaming as well as emergency wartime repairs.  Capability could not be grown 
overnight and required political backing as well. 
As the Navy progressed through the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
naval leaders continually sought whatever funding they could obtain.  Supporting 
arguments for funding ranged from diversifying naval infrastructure as a hedge against 
wartime losses to simply gaining more federal funding in an area.  A common argument 
throughout the era was that there was no meaningful difference between peace and war 
for the Navy, as the ships and infrastructure required to implement foreign doctrine 
required a standing force.  Furthermore, a force could not be summoned and rapidly built 
at the outbreak of war mainly due to the small size of the U.S. shipbuilding industry 
compared to Europe.  The argument however often fell short of convincing Congress; 
congressmen feared losing contracts and ship repairs to overseas bases and also sought 
the funding for these programs brought to their districts.   
Similar issues of balancing naval ship construction and public works 
improvements faced the British.  From 1897-1904, Britain had to continuously seek extra 
naval bills to fund naval infrastructure improvements while leaving the annual naval acts 
small to allow for battle fleet production.
158
  After the shift to dreadnought and 
battlecruiser construction occurred in 1905, government financial issues took a toll on the 
British infrastructure.  In the four years leading up to the outbreak of the Great War, 
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British spending on naval works fell to less than half that of 1904.
159
  However, the 
United States never spent at the relative level of the Royal Navy on base improvements.  
From 1897-1904, the British public works expenditures was equal to half the funds 
allocated for battleship and cruiser construction.
160
  During the same period, the United 
States had added eight overseas bases, and two continental bases; yet, the total spent on 
the number of naval bases was equal to twenty-five percent of battleship construction 
allocations.  While the British were able to allocate adequate funds to naval shore 
establishments the Americans inflated battleship construction at the cost of building 
commensurate means of support. 
The leaders of the Navy and Congress ignored the unpalatable fact that building a 
fleet was not equivalent to the creation of a functional navy.  A navy required the 
maintenance facilities, the supplies, as well as the ships with trained personnel to 
properly function.   Ignoring any one of these categories could cripple a navy either in 
peace or combat.  When the Navy Act of 1916 was passed the American Navy possessed 
a large battle fleet but not a globally-deployable navy.  Lacking large dry docks overseas 
as well as large defended bases near areas of probable conflict, the battle fleet could not 
fight effectively and would have focused too much on damage aversion then effectively 
combating an adversary. 
The same methodological oversight by the contemporary leaders of the New 
Navy occurred with much of the scholarship covering the period.  Battleships remained 
the focus of the analysis of the period.  Overseas bases received the most attention, 
namely in regards to diplomatic moves by the U.S.  However, the relative spending on 
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these overseas bases and their actual facilities in comparison to domestic bases is 
overlooked.  Additionally, while the Wilson administration soon realized that dry docks 
were a valuable comparison tool in comparing relative naval strengths of nations, many 
authors have ignored this critical component of naval operational logistics.  Comparisons 
to Britain were often in terms of ships and technology, comparing bases and funding 
public works improvements brings a more complete picture of the relative merits of the 
Royal Navy and the American Navy. 
Naval bases remained a consistent problem for the Navy to keep maintained and 
up to date with new ship construction.  Inner service indecision, inter-service rivalries, 
and political wrangling caused an inconsistent base policy.  Overseas bases consistently 
fell woefully short of naval planners’ desires as well as the example set by Britain.  The 
size and number of dry docks lagged even further behind.  The call for change came as a 
result of the 1916 Navy Act.  Only when the U.S. fleet was going to rise to global 
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Table 1: U.S. Base Public Works and General Budget 1898-1916 
 
  
Table 1: U.S. Base Public Works and General Budget 1898-1916
1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907
Boston Navy Yard 14,500 177,400 379,000 966,300 551,850 702,700 479,200 256,800 162,900 95,040
Cavite PI Naval Station 0 0 0 0 0 233,500 322,500 735,000 0 0
Charleston SC Navy Yard 0 0 0 0 0 913,300 300,000 706,500 396,000 471,500
Culebra Naval Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guam Naval Station 0 0 0 0 107,300 0 10,000 0 10,000 12,000
Guantanamo Bay Naval Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 300,000 385,000 0 0
Key West Naval Station 35,000 25,000 112,520 100,426 144,000 118,950 165,000 2,000 29,000 40,109
League Island Navy Yard 193,222 296,500 800,767 939,500 695,230 522,300 349,200 512,970 377,000 108,000
Mare Island Navy Yard 216,785 632,571 935,750 478,200 331,660 225,500 188,000 260,000 322,000 143,000
New London Navy Yard 0 200,000 25,000 0 0 41,000 2,500 0 0 0
New Orleans Naval Station 377,530 0 0 339,000 111,800 271,500 95,000 215,500
New York Navy Yard 153,000 855,037 1,047,062 1,208,900 1,009,000 560,500 313,000 371,500 82,200 128,500
Newport Naval Station 0 1,000 1,000 0 0 0 100,000 0 0 0
Norfolk Navy Yard 130,000 171,000 500,000 477,700 594,260 344,000 193,000 959,000 148,000 404,500
Olongapo Naval Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 806,395 100,000 207,000
Pearl Harbor Naval Station 0 0 0 144,443 26,120 42,556 77,787 1,528 4,235 2,434
Pensacola Naval Station 0 110,133 0 9,500 41,500 2,500 148,000 94,000 135,500 40,000
Port Royal Naval Station 11,837 455,325 145,000 169,823 49,802 22,793 48,287 5,026 42,487 8,556
Portsmouth Navy Yard 0 0 306,000 406,000 364,850 872,575 917,000 149,000 400,400 367,498
Puget Sound Navy Yard 80,143 132,832 48,500 276,706 273,000 810,500 295,200 292,500 213,500 205,000
San Juan Naval Station 2,510 52,000 40,000 50,000 0 0 0 0
Tutuila Naval Station 59,797 43,095 69,006 127,371 42,565 40,791 34,886 20,181 43,996
Washington Navy Yard 5,132 96,347 205,000 591,272 684,611 631,292 449,500 821,287 581,511 307,676
Total Public Works 839,619 3,212,942 4,928,734 5,889,776 5,040,554 6,475,531 4,810,765 6,664,892 3,119,914 2,800,309
1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907
Maintenance of Yards 375,000 350,000 400,012 500,654 574,127 702,689 762,959 795,066 755,235 867,816
Pay 8,238,157 17,955,460 3,000,353 12,861,720 15,150,285 16,139,072 17,707,249 19,326,034 20,000,000 21,293,775
Construction and Repair 4,600,143 8,950,000 5,690,220 7,500,477 7,001,190 8,011,069 8,001,811 8,024,324 7,804,866 7,900,000
Increase of Navy (Construction and Repair) 6,425,359 13,648,473 5,992,402 12,740,699 21,000,000 13,303,010 15,025,632 26,826,860 23,410,833 17,830,829
Increase of Navy (Armor and Armament) 7,220,796 7,162,800 4,000,000 4,000,000 8,000,000 9,000,000 12,000,000 18,000,000 18,000,000 15,145,000
Increase of Navy (Torpedo Boats) 0 0 0 0 0 0 500,000 350,000 0 500,000
Total Increase of Navy 13,646,155 20,811,273 9,992,402 16,740,699 29,000,000 22,303,010 27,525,632 45,176,860 41,410,833 33,475,829








Table 1: U.S. Base Public Works and General Budget 1898-1916 (Cont.)
1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916
Boston Navy Yard 128,500 197,800 210,000 105,000 277,000 240,000 129,000 170,000 25,000
Cavite PI Naval Station 13,000 59,700 15,900 0 0 0 0 0 0
Charleston SC Navy Yard 287,000 167,000 135,500 0 70,000 39,000 159,000 180,000 95,000
Culebra Naval Station 2,000 11,100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guam Naval Station 22,500 32,000 44,000 5,000 32,000 0 25,000 0 0
Guantanamo Bay Naval Station 0 0 0 0 378,500 0 0 38,000 0
Key West Naval Station 44,500 0 45,000 137,767 107,000 50,500 0 0 5,000
League Island Navy Yard 125,500 190,000 467,600 215,000 160,000 150,367 223,491 265,000 55,000
Mare Island Navy Yard 248,500 211,000 572,000 102,000 345,000 80,000 80,000 237,000 65,000
New London Navy Yard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Orleans Naval Station 156,300 56,000 45,000 64,677 0 0 0 0 5,000
New York Navy Yard 263,800 285,000 392,000 1,206,000 879,000 125,000 270,000 143,500 135,000
Newport Naval Station 7,840 139,890 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Norfolk Navy Yard 365,500 705,000 300,000 895,000 322,500 158,288 262,500 25,000 130,000
Olongapo Naval Station 90,000 100,000 0 0 0 0 30,000 0 0
Pearl Harbor Naval Station 1,000,000 1,200,000 2,535,000 2,262,000 1,532,000 629,000 70,000 0
Pensacola Naval Station 242,500 36,000 20,000 2,000 0 0 0 0 15,000
Port Royal Naval Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portsmouth Navy Yard 279,900 248,000 96,500 55,250 229,000 44,000 35,000 0 0
Puget Sound Navy Yard 258,500 560,000 655,000 885,000 246,000 65,000
San Juan Naval Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tutuila Naval Station 6,000 15,000 5,500 0 300 0 0 0 0
Washington Navy Yard 85,000 48,000 60,000 146,000 109,500 200,000 53,000 100,000 145,000
Total Public Works 2,626,840 4,061,490 4,264,000 6,353,694 5,171,800 2,619,155 2,141,991 1,228,500 740,000
1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916
Maintenance of Yards 950,000 1,250,000 1,514,419 1,394,498 1,540,000 1,500,030 1,500,670 1,600,000 1,774,000
Pay 23,978,659 30,974,580 32,803,521 33,665,581 35,510,059 37,280,971 39,264,662 40,963,667 41,240,563
Construction and Repair 7,903,306 8,000,000 8,979,144 8,979,144 8,979,144 8,979,144 8,250,000 9,788,000 9,166,127
Increase of Navy (Construction and Repair)12,713,915 12,832,962 22,766,823 19,400,753 13,781,785 9,846,205 19,818,228 19,647,617 20,664,459
Increase of Navy (Armor and Armament)12,000,000 11,000,000 12,452,772 11,565,122 10,532,928 7,265,200 11,724,192 17,412,500 18,957,998
Increase of Navy (Torpedo Boats) 500,000 3,000,000 3,000,000 2,104,971 1,690,833 2,521,647 3,353,275 3,810,617 6,231,344
Total Increase of Navy 25,213,915 26,832,962 38,219,595 33,070,846 26,005,546 19,633,052 34,895,695 40,870,734 45,853,801
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Table 4: Naval and Army Percentage of National Budget 
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Table 6: U.S. Naval Bases and Dry Docks 1898-1916 
 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Great Britain Naval Bases and Dry Docks 1916 
Installation Drydocks Installation Drydocks Installation 
Home Dockyards Overseas Dockyards Overseas Coaling Stations 
Chatham 
650X84X33 Auckland 521X66X33 Fortified 
456X82X33 Bermuda Floating 545X92X33 Aden 
456X82X33 
Bombay 
500X65X28 Cape Coast Castle 
456X80X32 990X100X35 King George Sound 
460X80X32 Brisbane 431X55X19 Port Stanley 
Devonport/Keyham 
430X93X34 Colombo (Ceylon) 708X85X32 Saint Helena 




420X80X30 550X90X35 Bridgetown 
741X95X44 450X90X35 Hobart 
659X95X32 Halifax 572X89X29 Wen-Hai-Wei (China) 
Haulbowline 608X94X32 Hong Kong 555X95X39 
 
Portsmouth 




 613X93X33 520X94X33 
 850X110X36 468X80X32 
 850X110X36 770X95X34 
 Floating 680X113X36 550X95X34 
 
Rosyth 
850X110X36 Mauritius 384X60X19 
 850X110X36 Montreal 600X100X28 
 850X110X36 Penang 343X46X14 
 Sheerness Floating 680X113X36 Port Charles 500X70X21 
 Home Harbors Prince Rupert Floating 600X95X30 
 Berehaven   Quebec 1150X120X30 
 Cromarty Firth   Simon's Bay 750X95X36 
 Dover   
Singapore 
467X65X20 
 Falmouth   478X60X21 
 Harwich   400X47X16 
 Kingstown   450X52X19 
 Lough Swilly   846X100X34 
 Pembroke 404X75X24 
Sydney 
638X84X32 
 Portland   477X59X21 
 Scapa Flow   Trinidad Floating 365X65X18 
 Torbay   






Table 8: U.S. Battleship and Armored Cruiser Classes 1898-1916 
Class 
Year 
Completed Type Displacement Length Beam Draft 
New York 1893 ACR 9,000 tons 348 ft 65 ft 24 ft 
Indiana 1895 BB 11,700 tons 351 ft 69 ft 24 ft 
Brooklyn 1896 ACR 10,100 tons 402 ft 64 ft 24 ft 
Iowa 1897 BB 12,650 tons 362 ft 72 ft 24 ft 
Kearsarge 1900 BB 12,850 tons 375 ft 72 ft 24 ft 
Illinois 1901 BB 12,250 tons 375 ft 72 ft 24 ft 
Maine 1902 BB 12,723 tons 393 ft 72 ft 24 ft 
Pennsylvania 1905 ACR 15,100 tons 503 ft 70 ft 24 ft 
Virginia 1906 BB 16,100 tons 441 ft 76 ft 24 ft 
Connecticut 1906 BB 17,700 tons 456 ft 77 ft 25 ft 
St Louis 1906 ACR 10,900 tons 426 ft 66 ft 23 ft 
Tennessee 1906 ACR 15,700 tons 505 ft 73 ft 25 ft 
Vermont 1907 BB 17,700 tons 456 ft 77 ft 25 ft 
Mississippi 1908 BB 14,500 tons 382 ft 77 ft 25 ft 
South 
Carolina 1910 BB 17,700 tons 450 ft 81 ft 25 ft 
Delaware 1910 BB 22,100 tons 520 ft 85 ft 27 ft 
Florida 1911 BB 23,000 tons 522 ft 88 ft 28 ft 
Wyoming 1912 BB 27,200 tons 562 ft 93 ft 29 ft 
New York 1914 BB 28,400 tons 573 ft 96 ft 29 ft 
Nevada 1916 BB 28,400 tons 583 ft 96 ft 29 ft 
Pennsylvania 1916 BB 32,600 tons 608 ft 97 ft 29 ft 
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